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The twentieth century had staged a grand social experiment in which central planning com-
peted against the market system. Initially, the strong economic performance of Soviet Union
and China o¤ered aspirations to many poor, developing countries, but eventually the pros-
perity of the market economies had triggered the central planned economies to adopt massive
reforms towards the market system. Much can be learned from these alternative systems for
understanding economic history and the determinants of economic performance and growth.
This paper joins the vast literature on economic transition by investigating the relationship
between macroeconomic volatility and economic systems using data covering six decades of
economic development and transition in China.
The relationship between output volatility and economic systems has been an important
theme in the writings of classical economists. According to Marx (1867) [19], one of the major
contradictions between the forces and relations of production under capitalism is the periodic
depressions that are inherent in a capitalist economy. As commented by Schumpeter (1992)
[29], Marx is a pioneer in researching businesss cycle and not only see the crisis period but
also the logic behind the entire cycle but he did not have a complete business cycle theory by
the time he died. Marx followers developed business cycle theory that envisioned capitalism
cannot avoid periodic crises, and the increasing volatility in investment and production
would eventually lead to the collapse of the system. By contrast, Hayek (1945) [11] held
the opposing view. He argued that a monopolistic governmental agency such as a central
planner can neither possess the relevant information to coordinate economic activities, nor
have the ability to use it correctly; centralized decision making would lead to major economic
uctuations. Schumpeter (1992) [29] is in the middle. He argues that socalism planning can
possibly reduce business cycle volatility by reducing the waste of over-production and the
unemployment in theory though it may not be achievable in reality. He said in a socialist
society unemployment will be less, mainly in consequence of the elimination of depressions.
Despite these inuential ideas on economic systems and volatility, limited research has been
conducted on this fundamental topic. The main objective of this paper is to ll this void.
The main motivating facts for the current study are the decline in output volatility com-
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monly observed in transitional economies. Figure 1 plots the output volatilities measured as
rolling window standard deviation of real GDP growth for four Asian transitional economies
as compared with the U.S..1 To facilitate comparison, we normalize the beginning year of
economic reform to zero for the four Asian economies, while using 1984 as the comparable
benchmark for the U.S. because that year signies the inception of the Great Moderation
identied by McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) [20]. While the volatility for the Asian
economies was much higher than that of the U.S. before economic reforms, the variability
has gradually converged to the U.S. in recent years. Figure 2 presents similar patterns for
four European transitional economies. Because of the dissolution of states in Europe, consis-
tent data before the reforms are not available for the European countries except for Poland.
What is common across these transitional economies in Asia and Europe is the nearly im-
mediate and continuous decline in output volatility since the inception of economic reforms.
Admittedly, other forces and factors may have contributed to the more pronounced decline
in GDP uctuations in the transitional economies relative to market economies. A central
task of this paper is to examine whether the changes of economic systems from central plan-
ning to a mixed system, and then from a mixed system to a market-oriented regime have
contributed signicantly to the reduction in volatility.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
[Insert Figure 2 here]
The main hypothesis of this paper is that a centrally planned economy is intrinsically more
volatile than a decentralized market system because the implementation of a centralized plan
is likely to generate systemic risks within the economy, thus causing nationwide economic
uctuations. In contrast, good and bad decisions under a decentralized framework tend to
neutralize each other; and, when disequilibrium occurs in the system, individual agents may
quickly adjust their decisions to cope with the situation. We demonstrate these ideas through
an illustrative production model of human fallibility in which production decisions can be
1The data for all countries including China are from the Pen World Table 8.0.
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made either by a central planner and implemented subsequently to lower organizations OR
the decisions are made and carried out by decentralized agents. Model simulations suggest
that output volatility is signicantly higher under the centralized system, and economic
transition towards decentralized decision making would lower production variability.
We test the main implications of the model based on panel data from 28 Chinese provinces
covering the period from 1952 to 2008. China experienced three types of economic regimes
over this historical period: a centrally planned economy between 1952-1978, a mixed sys-
tem of planning with market adjustments between 1979-1993, and a full-edged transition
towards the market economy between 1994-2008. Our empirical analyses proceed through
several stages. First, we document a striking pattern of volatility decline over the ve decades
of economic planning and transition. The output volatility measured by the rolling window
standard deviation of real GDP growth dropped 74% from the period of planning in 1953-
1977 to the period of reforms and transition in 1978-2008; and, within the second period,
output uctuations further declined more than 50% from the mixed system in 1978-1994
to the market system in 1995-2008. Contrary to the conjectures of Marx, central planning
actually magnied output volatility rather than reduced it. The rst phase of volatility
reduction was more dramatic, following the inception of economic reforms in 1978, whereas
the second phase of moderation was more gradual yet signicant, following the acceleration
of market reforms started in 1993.
Second, given the observed decline in overall output volatility, we construct a measure of
sector-specic (agriculture, industry, and service), province-year output shocks by removing
the trend components in the data using Hodrick-Prescott (HP) lters. Our subsequent task
is to investigate the sources of these province-year output shocks and examine how much of
the volatility reduction is attributable to the transition from planning to market.
As the third stage of analyses, we remove the inuence of conventional economic factors,
including nancial development, openness, inventory management and monetary policy that
determine volatility, from the output shocks constructed above. Then, we conduct a variance
decomposition of the shocks, NET of the inuence of these variables, into national, provincial,
sectoral, covariance, and residual components. Through these procedures, we can pin down
the sources of volatility reduction that are attributable to central planning. We nd that
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central planning generated systemic shocks at the national and provincial levels in China,
which were the main sources of output uctuations during the centrally planned system.
Therefore, subsequent transition from planning towards a mixed and market systems has led
to a dramatic moderation in output variability in China.
This paper is related to three strings of literature. The rst is on the relationship between
economic systems and output volatility, tracing back to the works of Marx (1867) [19] and
Hayek (1945) [11]. Li and Yang (2005) [34] is a related paper in which they analyzed
the catastrophic event of the Great Leap Forward movement in China between 1958 and
1961, concluding that central planning was the main culprit of the disaster. The second
string is the great moderation literature in which studies nd signicantly persistent decline
in output volatility in the US and other OECD countries starting in the mid-1980s (e.g.,
Kim and Nelson, 1999 [15]; McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000 [20]; Blanchard and Simon,
2001 [5]. The third string is on business cycles and output volatility reduction in China
(e.g., Brandt and Zhu, 2000 [6]; Wahid and Jalil, 2010 [31]) and during the process of
economic development (Koren and Tenreyro, 2007 [16]). To our knowledge, our paper is the
rst study that examines the relationship between volatility and economic systems - one that
investigates the mechanisms of output uctuations under central planning and documents the
decline in output volatility through three stages of economic reforms: from central planning
to a mixed system of planning with market adjustments, and from the mixed system towards
a full-edged market system.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a brief review of
the related literature. Based on provincial data set covering the period of 1952 to 2008, we
examine the basic features of output volatility in China in Section 3. This section provides
a detailed description about our data set, including the sources of GDP data and general
price series, both on the provincial and national levels. In Section 4.1, we outline an illus-
trative model to study the sources of output volatility under two alternative regimes, central
planning versus a decentralized market system. In Section 5, we decompose the overall in-
novations to national, province-specic, and sector-specic shocks and explain what kinds
of risks should be responsible for the sharpest drop in output volatility starting in the late
1970s. Empirical evidence suggests that the regime shifts were the major forces behind the
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drop in output volatility. In Section 6, we present some tentative conclusions.
2 Literature Review
We believe that this is the rst paper to discuss the role played by economic transition in
reducing output volatility. There are di¤erent parts of literature that are related to this
paper.
One part of literature studies Chinas business cycles and output volatility.2 To the
best of our knowledge, studies devoted directly to analyzing output volatility reduction
in China are limited. For instances, Zhang and Zhang (2010) [35] and He, Hou, Wang,
Zhang (2014) [12] have discussed the matter in some details. Zhang and Zhang (2010)
[35] provided a highly detailed analysis on the trend of the volatility of the GDP series in
China along with its components. Using the quarterly GDP data during 1978-2009, they
nd a statistically signicant break in the variance of the GDP series in 1993. They also
document the secular change in the characteristics of the volatility series of employment,
the Total Factor Productivity (TFP), the expenditure GDP components and the provincial
GDP growth. He et al. (2014) [12] mainly focused on periods after Chinese economic reform
had started, and do not study the regime change due to the economic transition directly.
The other part of the literature studied the business cycles and made e¤ort to decompose
economic uctuations into, for example, sectoral, regional and aggregate shocks. But none
of the papers in this literature studied output ucturations in regime changes. Our paper
is closely related to this literature in terms of the methods we used. For example, Norrbin
and Schlagenhauf (1988) [24] decomposed the uctuations in employment in the US. Other
papers include Altonji and Ham (1990) [2], Ghoosh andWolf (1997) [9], Del Negro (2002) [21],
Koren and Tenreyro (2007) [16], Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) [13] and etc.
Another set of related papers studied the so called Great moderation and its possible
causes. Those researches examined the trend of business cycle volatility for most industri-
alized countries after the 1980s. Output volatility in these countries declined dramatically
from the 1980s, a phenomenon which was referred to as the Great Moderation in the liter-
2See Brandt and Zhu (2000) [6], Zhang and Zhang (2010) [35], Wahid and Jalil (2010) and etc.
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ature. Most advanced economies, such as the U.S., its fellow members in the G7 and many
other industrialized countries, experienced a dramatic reduction in volatility of aggregate
economic activities. Volatility reduction is evident for output and employment at the aggre-
gate level and across most industrial sectors and expenditure categories. Ination level and
ination volatility have also declined dramatically. For instance, the volatility of GDP, total
goods production, durable-goods consumption and production, total investment, residential
investment, construction output, and imports declined sharply in the mid-1980s in the U.S.
(Stock and Watson, 2002 [30]). The question remains as to whether and to what extent
this broad phenomenon is related to and shares common features with the output volatility
reduction we observed in China. The methods used and the factors considered in the Great
Moderation literature serve as valuable references to this paper.
The earliest analysis of the volatility reduction is an unpublished internal memorandum
at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System written by two sta¤ economists
(Gilchrist and Kashyap, 1990 [10]) whose daily job is to track the U.S. economy. In academic
journals, the rst published studies that identied moderation in volatility were that of Kim
and Nelson (1999) [15] and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) [20]. Later on, Blanchard
and Simon (2001) [5] and Jaimovich and Siu (2009) [14] nd evidence of similar reduction
in output volatility in other industrialized countries, such as the members of G7 countries.
Japan is the only possible exception because it has actually experienced an increase in
output volatility after the 1990s.3 Inspired by the seminal papers there have been extensive
researches on the reduction of volatility many of which published in leading journals.4 There
is much less doubt or dispute about the existence of the reduction in output volatility5 than
on whether the sharp decline in volatility is a sudden brake (McConnell and Perez-Quiros,
2000 [20]) or a continuous trend (Blanchard and Simon, 2001 [5]) as well as on the reasons6
3The exception, however, might o¤er clues in understanding the reasons behind the widespread volatility
moderation.
4See Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2004) [1], Dynan, Elmendorf and Sichel (2006) [8], Davis and Kahn
(2008) [7], Jaimovich and Siu (2009) [14], and Benati and Surico (2009) [3], among others.
5The nancial crisis in 2008 may complicate the matter given that highly signicant uctuations happened
after most of the papers had been written. Whether Great Moderation ended after the 2008 Great
Recession remains a topic under dispute (see for example Ng and Wright (2015) [22]).
6See Stock and Watson (2002) [30], Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2004) [1], Dynan, Elmendorf and Sichel
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behind such a sharp decline. The two elds of discussions are inevitably interrelated. The
explanations behind this moderation depend on whether it was a brake or a trend. For
instance, if it were a brake, it should be more reasonable to search for events happening
around the date of the brake. Meanwhile, the main reasons behind the moderation would
determine whether it happened as a brake or as a continuous trend. If the moderation were
the result of a once-and-for-all structural change in the economy toward a more stable one,
it would be more likely that a brake in the output volatility would be observed.
One of the reasons why output volatility moderation is interesting to study is that lowered
volatility leads to longer expansion even though the expansion only has a moderate mag-
nitude. As alleged by Blanchard and Simon (2001) [5], the large decrease in the standard
deviation of output shocks is at the root of the two long expansions the United States has
recently experienced. The growth e¤ect of the reduction in volatility can be the results of
pure statistical measurement or may possibly come from more complicated resources, such as
a reduced systematic risk in the economy. The searching for the actual mechanism, which is
part of the theme in this paper, on how reduction in output volatility can enhance economic
growth may induce new researches.
On the other hand, as Bernanke (2004) [4] remarks in his discussion of the Great Mod-
eration: Explanations of complicated phenomena are rarely clear cut and simple, and
each...probably contains elements of truth." It is hardly untrue as changes and transitions
happened in the past quarter century largely exceed what happened in the past several
centuries. The continuous globalization, the internationally division of labor and special-
ization, the lowering of economic and political barriers to international trade and nance,
the unprecedented improvement in technology may have all contributed to the shift in the
way economy operates. To a certain extent, research on the global output moderation is the
moon in the mirror, when compared with the studies about the new economies that emerged
in the past decades.
(2006) [8], Davis and Kahn (2008) [7], Jaimovich and Siu (2009) [14], Benati and Surico (2009) [3], etc.
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3 Reduction of Output Volatility in China
3.1 Data Description
The data of Chinas GDP and its components are obtained from China Compendium of
Statistics 19492008, published by National Bureau of Statistics. The database has compre-
hensive statistics of China both on the national and into the provincial level. Our national
nominal GDP and its components decomposed by income approach and expenditure ap-
proach data start from 1952 to 2008. The availability of provincial data vary to some extent.
Several revisions of the national account data by the Chinese Statistical Bureau exist, par-
ticularly the signicant revision in 2004 using data from the economic census. The data used
are accounted for the revisions. The provincial data set includes 28 provinces in China i.e.
Anhui, Beijing, Fujian, Gansu, Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan,
Hubei, Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, Liaoning, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi,
Shandong, Shanghai, Shanxi, Sichuan, Tianjin, Xinjiang, Yunnan, Zhejiang. Chongqing and
Tibet are excluded for data consistency. Hainan is excluded because the observations are
missing for years before 1978.
3.2 Stylized facts
As a starting point, we employ several simple statistical methods to analyze the basic features
of the output volatility series in China. The ups-and-downs before 1980s are frequent and
large in scale, when the drop in output growth in 1961 reached 27 percent. The 5-year rolling
window standard deviation and the mean of annual real GDP growth by income approach
are plotted in Figure 3. The rst observation available for the GDP growth is 1953, and so
the rst observation for the standard deviation and mean of the growth rate is 1956. The
existence of a dramatic reduction in output volatility in China is obvious and clear. The
volatility of GDP growth dropped from a at peak in 1960s to a historical low in 1977.
After the sharp drop in the late 1970s, the output volatility continued to trend down over
time except for a mild up-side deviation from the declining trend in the 1990s. If a similar
gure is plotted for the volatility of consumer spending, capital formation and government
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spending, a highly similar pattern would be observed.7 The trend in the mean of GDP
growth, however, is di¤erent. It was more volatile during the 1960s and 1970s and shifted
to a rising track after 1977. It then remained at a relatively stable and high level.
Surprisingly, during the central planning era in China, especially years before 1978, the
output volatility was much larger than in the later period when more market mechanisms
were introduced. In the conventional frame-of-thought,8 plans set by the central planner
in the central planning economy to balance demand and supply, though may be ine¢cient,
can at least maintain reasonable consistency and thus lead to a low volatility. Nevertheless,
our empirical results suggest that such man-made plans would result in more volatility as
opposed to reducing it. We will o¤er our explanation later in this paper.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
The rolling window standard deviation is one popular and standard way to measure
volatility. But one can think of other ways. It is generally assumed that output time
series data have a trend component and potentially several volatile components of di¤erent
frequencies. Di¤erent detrending methods may provide us with the volatile series of di¤erent
frequencies. As a result, the measured volatility may di¤er, though not necessarily so. Some
alternatives to calculate the volatile series of GDP are, for instance, rst di¤erence between
the levels of the logarithm of output, a Hodrick-Prescott-ltered (HP) series or a Baxter-
King-ltered (BP) series. These alternatives will not change the basic results.
The results of the volatility reduction calculated by using di¤erent detrending methods are
presented in Table 2. Hodrick-Prescott lter is one of the standard tools used in removing the
trend of time series. Recent work of Ravn, and Uhlig (2002) [26] show that the appropriate
value of the smooth parameter is 6.25 for annual data when isolating uctuations at the
traditional business cycle frequencies (those higher than eight years) while a smoothing
parameter of 100 is used in much of the macroeconomics literature. We report the results
7The investigation of the potential relationship between the components of income approach GDP and
expenditure approach is beyond this paper. The gure by expenditures is available in the online appendix.
8At least with regard to the popular frame-of-thought in Marx era when central planning was commonly
used.
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for both choices. We also use the band-pass-lter proposed by Baxter and King to isolate
uctuations between two and eights years in frequency. In addition, we consider real output
detrended by rst-di¤erencing which amplies high-frequency uctuations relative to HP
lter. This detrending method is used by Kim and Nelson (1999) [15] and McConnell and
Perez-Quiros (2000) [20].
The reduction in output volatility from 1955-1977 to 1978-2006 is around 75% regardless
of the employed detrending method. The reduction in output volatility from 1978-1994 to
1995-2006 is approximately around 60% for three methods we have considered. Though the
reduction in output volatility measure by HP100 is much lower to be less than 40%, it is still
considerable.
[Insert Table 2 here]
While the simple graph analysis already revealed facts that are of signicant interest, a
more structural method can be used. Now, we may go one step further by investigating in
details the process generating the output movement observed in Figure 3.
The large drop in output volatility leads to an interesting question whether this reduction
in output volatility is a sudden brake or a declining trend as inquired in the literature. As
a rst cut, we regress the real GDP growth rate on a constant and a time trend. The time
trend is negative and insignicant. This insignicance of the trend term is robust to the
use of the rst di¤erence of GDP growth rather than the level, as well as to the inclusion
of a lagged dependent variable. According to McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) [20], this
insignicance is a preliminary evidence of instability in the mean GDP growth rate. Besides,
we further test the existence of such a structural brake in the GDP series. Before proceeding
to the statistical test, we rst present some candidates for the brake dates. The evolution of
the Chinese economy suggests several possible periods of rapid shift in economic structure
that will likely cause the structural breaks in the GDP series: 1978-1980 when the Cultural
Revolution ended and China started to transform from a central planning economy to a
market economy; 1992 to 1994 when Deng visited the southern part of China and then
afterward, the special economic zones were set up in south China and substantial reforms
were introduced to the tax and foreign exchange system. This allows us to perform the
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standard Chow test for the break points.9 First, we t the GDP growth series with an
AR(1) process and then use the Chow test to test a break point in 1980 and 1994 jointly.
The null hypothesis of no break point can be rejected at the 5% condential level (See Table
1).
[Insert Table 1 here]
[Insert Figure 4 here]
[Insert Figure 5 here]
4 Some Discussion on Regime Change and Volatility
Reduction
Shortly after the establishment of the Peopless Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, China
nished the socialism transformation and created a central planning economy in the Soviet
style. Peasants were organized into cooperatives and later peoples communes. Enterprises
and commerce were nationalized, which in e¤ect made private market useless. Under central
planning regime, quotas and administration control were the tools used by the government
to organize economic activities. The economic reform gave the decision making back to
economic agents, such as rms, farmers and consumers, and brought back free market and
market prices. The economic reform started from the agriculture. One well-known reform
was to replace cooperatives with Household Responsibility System (HRS). At the same time,
free market was allowed so that peasants can sell their grain after they fullled the required
quotas. Lin (1992) [18] documented that the agricultural reform resulted in remarkable
9Perez-Quiros (2000) [20] provided sophisticated econometric methods in testing the existence of a break
in the GDP volatile series. Zhang and Zhang (2010) [35] demonstrated a highly detailed test using quarterly
GDP data during 1978-2009 for the breaks in the mean GDP growth rate, the volatility of GDP growth rate
and the di¤erent GDP subcomponents. They did nd a signicant brake in the volatility of GDP growth in
1993.
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agricultural growth. The rapid growth in agriculture was the motor of Chinas growth right
after the reform in the 1980s. Then the growth of the township-village enterprises (TVEs)
were the main driving force until early 1990s. The new entries of rms in the rst fteen year
of reforms were mostly TVEs, and they drove Chinas growth in that period (Qian, 2002 [25]).
The economic reforms that establish free markets and let economic agents competes in the
free markets turn out to not only bring high economic growth but also be volatility reducing.
The governance structure of China is hierarchical, but the structure of regional govern-
ment is similar to the central government (Xu (2011) [33]). Each region is self-contained,
and controls similar functions, such as personnel, nance, industry, and agriculture. Xu
(2011) [33] calls the Chinas institution a regionally decentralized authoritarian system
(RDA), and argue that it can explain why China could have high economic growth de-
spite of ill-suited institutions. What we discover in this paper is that the decentralization
that happened after the economic reforms also explain the huge reduction in output volatility
in the past decades. The discussion on reforms of delegating power to the local governments
actually started as early as in the 1960s (Wu, 2005 [32]). But the later radical political
movement made it impossible to turn much of the discussion into practice.
4.1 An illustrative model of transition
One of the most important changes from central planning to market economy is decision
making decentralization both from central government to provincial governments and from
provincial governments to local governments and individual economic agents. Decentraliza-
tion of decision making reduced the risk of making policy errors.10 A simple illustrative
model of two-tier governments is helpful to get the idea. A key ingredient of this model
is human fallibility as modeled by Sah and Stiglitz (1991) [28] and Sah (1991) [27]. The
governors of the government have limited capacity to collect and process information. As
a consequence, they could make mistakes in making important economic decisions. This
simple economy has one central government and 28 provincial governments. In the central-
ized regime, the central government determines the projects in all the provinces. In the
10Part of the intuition is similar to risk diversication in portfolio theory. Do not put all your eggs in one
basket.
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where Yt is the gross domestic product, Kt is capital, Lt is labor, and At is the economic
e¢ciency in period t. At will depend on the quality of projects pursued by the governments.
There are two types of governors, who can either have high (h) or low (l) ability. The
quality of the public projects is a random variable gi (i = h; l). The high ability governors
can choose projects of quality g with probability ph, and g with with probability 1   ph.
Similarly, low ability governors can choose projects of quality g with probability pl, and g
with with probability 1  pl. We assume that g
 > g and ph > pl. Although no one has the
perfect information to choose the better projects, the high ability governors can choose a
good project with a higher probability. Local competition is thought to be a key contributor
to the sucess of Chinese economic reform (Li and Zhou, 2005 [17]). In this simple setting,
we can also test whether local competition contributes to the reduction of volatility. The
local competition could either help select better governors or help improve the quality of the
public projects.
Another observation is that the provincial governments could be more politically radical
than the central governments original planning because, for example, the provincial o¢cials
want to show their loyalty to the party. With this political radicalism measured by  being
greater than 1, output could uctuate more widely. With a radical provincial government,
the projects of quality g will become   g and the projects of quality g will become g=.
In another word, a radical provincial government can make good projects better while make
bad projects worse.
The economic e¢ciency At is a function of the projects governments choose. The function
form is









where J is the number of provinces. The function form is following Nishimura (2006) [23].
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In the central planning regime, one governor is chosen by the central government and he
or she will determine the projects for all the provinces. In the decentralized regime, each
province will have its own governor and each provincial governor will choose the project for
each province.
The result of such a decentralization is a substantial reduction in output volatility in
the economy (see Figure 6). The national output volatility stepped down after the reform.
In each simulation, before 1978 is considered to be central planning period. Capital and
labor are assumed to grow at a constant rate, and the growth rates are calibrated to Chinas
average during this period i.e. 9% for capital and 2.4% for labor. The volatility is measured
as 5-year rolling window standard deviation of HP-ltered volatile series. The intuition for
this volatility reduction is straightforward. The mistakes made by di¤erent provinces can
o¤set each other. As a result, a large negative shock, such as the Great Leap Forward
mistake, can not widely spread across provinces as what could happen during the central
planing period.
[Insert Figure 6 here]
Local competition could also help reduce the output volatility in some cases but not in
all cases. If there is a higher probability of choosing a good governor, the output volatility
will be lower. However, the magnitude of the reduction in output volatility is much smaller
than the decentralization channel (see Figure 7).
[Insert Figure 7 here]
If only the quality of the bad project is improved, the output volatility will be reduced.
But if only the quality of the good project is improved, the output volatility will actually
increase. This suggests that the quality di¤erences between good projects and bad projects
also matter. In the rst case when only the quality of the bad project is improved, the
quality gap is also narrow but the in the second case, the quality gap is enlarged (see Figure
8). With this simple model in mind, we can move on to test whether the real data behave
as our simple illustrative model has predicted.
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[Insert Figure 8 here]
5 Output Volatility Drop fromCentral-planning to Eco-
nomic transition
As we have documented in the previous sections, the volatility reduction is an important
feature of the Chinas economy over the decades. The dramatic regime changes not only
produced a high economic growth, but, at the same time, also muted the output volatility,
the biggest cycles being in the pre-reform era. In this section, we provide evidences to
explain why the regime changes from central planning to market economy will cause output
volatility to decline as a natural next-step.11 Here we are going to uncover what may account
for the decline in output volatility in China, and the explanation should have important
implications for other transitional economies, too. Before attacking this problem in a general
and formal way, a case study that can be abstracted from Li and Yang (2005) [34] would
provide insightful clues. The Great Chinese Famine was the driven reason behind the hike
in the volatility observed in Figure 3 in the 1960s. According to Li and Yang (2005) [34],
the governments mistake in resource allocation was the most important reason behind that
famine, and a major reason that central government made the grave mistake was because
the information it had was greatly wrong. The central government diverted massive resource
from the agricultural sector to manufacture and industry creating huge food shortage in the
rural area in the misperception that the food problem was eternally solved. As China started
its market reform, the entity to make resource allocation decision changed from government
to the market. As a result, this eliminated the possibility of huge policy mistakes, which
11The change of composition of di¤erent industries will not explain the reduction in volatility. In online
appendix, we exclude this composition change hypothesis by doing a counterfactual exercise. Assuming
that sectoral share stayed at the old level, the reduction of volatility is not changed. In Figure 4, the three
industries experience the same trend of output volatility reduction. This is why autonomously xing the
output shares of the di¤erent sectors yields essentially the same decline in the volatility as using the actual,
changing shares.
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would cause a disastrous drop in output as happened in the Great Chinese Famine.
It turns out that the observation obtained from the Great Chinese Famine is more general
as we will show in this section. The mechanism illustrated in Section 4.1 is a central trans-
formation from central planning to market economy. We argue that the regime change which
reduced the direct inuence of the government on economic activities was the main reason
behind the decline in volatility. As illustrated in the introduction, the e¤ect of economic
transition that successfully establishes a market system on output volatility is not unique in
China. In this section, we conduct a formal decomposition analysis to test the observation
from the Great Chinese Famine.
5.1 Methodology
Our model of China consists of di¤erent provinces and di¤erent sectors, which are subject to
di¤erent shocks and, therefore, subject to di¤erent risks that are associated with the shocks.
Our method of decomposing total innovations to di¤erent shocks is similar to Koren and
Tenreyro (2007) [16]. But we extend their framework in multiple dimensions. Most im-
portantly, we use a residual approach to produce the shocks series for decomposition. We
want to measure the e¤ects of regime changes on volatility controlling for other factors. As
suggested by the Great Moderation literature, a number of factors may contribute to the
decline in output volatility. Monetary policy, nancial intermediaries and inventory man-
agement are thought to be possible reasons to explain the Great Moderation in industrial
countries. Following the literature, ination is used as a proxy to measure monetary policy;
loan over GDP is used to measure shocks related to nancial intermediaries; and inventory
change over GDP is used to measure inventory management. Before the economic reform,
China was nearly a close economy. Economic reform opened the door of China , and world
economic shocks should have a bigger e¤ect on the output volatility in China thereafter.
Trade openness measured as export plus import over GDP is used to control for this ef-
fect. Meanwhile, we extend Koren and Tenreyro (2007)s [16] decomposition strategy from a
cross-country context to a cross-province context. In addition, we introduce one more type
of shocks. They have a country-specic shock and a sector-specic shock, while we have a
province-specic shock, a sector-specic shock and a national shock.
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We rst run a control regression on four factors, and collect the residual of the control
regressions as our measure of the shocks to the economy which will be used later for decom-
position. We control for the e¤ect of monetary policy, the credit shocks, the trade openness
and the inventory changes. Let Yjst be a measure of the total shocks in province j and sector
s at time t. In our basic specication Yjst is computed as the HP-ltered volatile series of
log real GDP of province j and sector s. This total shocks Yjst is then regressed on four
controls, and the residuals yjst are collected. Since all of our control variables are provincial,
a provincial regression is done for every sector. All the independent variables are lagged to
control for potential endogeneity problems. The control regressions are reported in Table 4.
Column 1 through Column 3 are regressions for primary, secondary and tertiary sector. The
summary statistics for the control variables are reported in Table 3.
[Insert Table 3 here]
[Insert Table 4 here]
After running the control regressions, we get the residual shock yjst. The total residual
shock yjst can be decomposed into di¤erent types of shocks. We assume that there are three
types of di¤erent shocks, a national shock, a province-specic shock, and a sector-specic
shock. Thus, yjst is broken down into four components:
yjst = Ct + st + jt + "jst (1)
where Ct is the national shock common to all provinces; jt is specic to a province but
common to all sectors; st is specic to a sector but common to all provinces; "jst captures
the unexplained residual. One important advantage of this decomposition strategy is that
it is cross-sectional, and the method is able to capture the e¤ect of the important regime
changes in China. Since the e¤ects of other factors have been controlled, the reason that
those shocks changes should primarily be regime changes.
By a rst-order approximation, the residual innovation qjt can be expressed as the





ajstyjst; qjt = a
0
jtyjt (2)
What we are interested in is the change of volatility measured as the variance of qjt. In
matrix form, the variance of qjt is expressed as:
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sector-specic variance covariance matrix; 
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collects the covariances of national shocks with the province-specic shocks,
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0 + C10) collects the covariances of national shocks with the sector-specic















collects the remaining terms. Detailed derivations of the above decomposition are left to the
appendix.
We can therefore decompose the variance of qjt into a number of variance and covariance
terms. Furthermore, those variance and covariance terms can be sorted into di¤erent risk
factors.
V ar (qj) = SY S + PROV + COV +RES
where SY S = a0j (
N + 





aj; COV = a
0






aj. SY S, PROV , COV , and RES are the four risk factors. SY S is the risk
associated with the variance of national and sector-specic shocks. We call it the systematic
risk because it is common to all provinces. The type of risk is going to cause output to
fall in all provinces. Our conjecture is that this type of risk is largely the result of central
government policies, which is the main interest of this paper. PROV is the risk associated
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with a specic province. This risk should largely be attributed to the di¤erent interpre-
tations of the central government policies by the provincial government and the provinces
own policies. It also captures whether there is political radicalism at the provincial level.
COV is the covariance risk between national and province-specic and between national and
sector-specic shocks. RES is the idiosyncratic part of the risk. It includes the variance of
idiosyncratic shocks and various covariance terms. As we will later see in Section 5.3, the
observed pattern of the reduction in volatility between economic regimes is mainly driven by
SY S and PROV . We believe that SY S captures the e¤ect of regime changes. It is measur-
ing how national shocks and sector shocks, probably the results of government policy errors,
are driving the volatility before and after the reforms. The reduction of PROV also con-
tributes to the decline of output volatility, but to a less extent. The provincial governments
largely resemble the central government.
5.2 Estimation
Empirically, there are two equivalent ways to estimate the various shocks. In this statistical
specication, the three types of shocks, namely the national shocks, the province-specic
shocks, the sector-specic shocks are estimated as follows. National shocks are measured
as the cross-province and cross-sector average of yjst. Province-specic shocks are then
identied as the within province average of yjst using only the portion not explained by
national shocks. Lastly, sector-specic shocks are measured as the cross-province average
of yjst using only the portion not explained by nation-specic and province-specic shocks.























yjst   bCt   bjt

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where bCt, bjt and bst are the estimates for the national shocks, the province-specic shocks,
and the sector-specic shocks.
The above statistical specication has an equivalent econometric representation. The
statistical decomposition strategy is equivalent to run a constrained OLS regression on the
set of province and sector dummies every year cross-sectionally. The proof of the equivalence
is provided in the appendix. Formally the econometric specication is given as following:








where di are dummies for each sector, hj are dummies for each province, and "jst is the
regression residual.
The econometric specication is close to the specication in Heston and Rouwenhorst
(1994) [13], but the research question in Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) [13] was di¤erent.
In the econometric specication, the shocks are estimated coe¢cients on the dummies. In
Figure 9, the estimated national shocks are plotted. There are huge ups and downs in
the 1960s and 1970s. The big negative national shocks in 1961 was a reection of the
disastrous Great Leap Forward and the Great Chinese Famine. The magnitude of national
shocks is much smaller after the economic reform. Especially, the national shocks was tamed
after a small cycle in the 1990s. Figure 10 shows the province-specic shocks which are
averaged to regional level, mainly for a better visual comparison. The four regions are
dened as following. The coastal region includes Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hebei, Jiangsu,
Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang; the northeast region includes Heilongjiang, Jilin,
Liaoning; the interior region includes Anhui, Guangxi, Guizhou, Henan, Hubei, Hunan,
Inner Mongolia, Jiangxi, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan; and the far west region include
Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Xinjiang. The province-specic shocks are also much smaller
in later years, and the magnitude of province-specic shocks are much smaller than national
shocks, about one tenth of the national shocks. Figure 11 plots the estimated sector-specic
shocks. The disastrous negative shocks in primary sector in the 1960s and the mirror shocks
in secondary sector tell precisely the same story as describe in Li and Yang (2005) [34].
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Government diverted massive resources from primary sector to secondary sector.
[Insert Figure 9 here]
[Insert Figure 10 here]
[Insert Figure 11 here]
With the estimated shocks, the variance and covariance matrixes in 5.1 are estimated by







































and the elements in 
"j is estimated by b2js = 1T
TP
t=1
b"2jst: In the actual estimation, the sample
is divided into three regimes. The variance covariance matrixes are estimated separately for
each regime.
With the estimated variance covariance matrixes, we can evaluate the importance of
di¤erent kinds of risks.
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5.3 Volatility Accounting
The risk factors derived from of decomposition strategy play di¤erent roles in the reduction
of volatility. In this section, the contributions of di¤erent risk factors are analyzed quan-
titatively.12 As China went from central planning to a transitional market economy, the
magnitude of various risk factors decreased substantially (Figure 13, Figure 14 and Figure
15). The estimated total risk is plotted in Figure 12. In all gures, each point represents
a province in the specic year. There are signicant drops when regimes change. The dis-
continuity is because the variance covariance matrixes are estimated separately for the three
regimes. The systematic risk reduces substantially going from the central-planning regime
to the market regime (Figure 13). Similar reductions happen in the provincial risk as well
(Figure 14).
[Insert Figure 12 here]
[Insert Figure 13 here]
[Insert Figure 14 here]
[Insert Figure 15 here]
We then do an accounting exercise by attributing the total reduction in the volatility of
qj to changes in di¤erent risk factors. The changes in the variance of qj can be decomposed
into changes in four di¤erent risk factors.
V ar (qj) = SY S +PROV +COV +RES (3)
Divide both side of Equation (3) by V ar (qj), the total reduction is decomposed into
parts explained by di¤erent risk factors.















Then, apply the above decomposition of variance to every province, and take average.
The result is shown in Table 5. SY S, PROV , COV , and RES are the four types of risk
factors. EXP adds up the contribution of SY S, PROV , COV , and RES. Regime change
1 is comparing before 1978 with after 1978 but before 1993, which is the regime change from
central planning to market transition. Regime change 2 is comparing 1978-1993 with after
1993. The concern that the e¤ects of the changes of sector weights may be important is
explicitly accounted for in the next section. For the regime change from before 1978 to after
1978, systematic risk is a major contributor to the decline. The reduction of volatility from
central planning to market economy mainly came from the reduction in systematic risk and
provincial risk. As we have show in the illustrative model, the local competition also also
contributes to reduction in output volatility and we think that these e¤ects will be captured
by the provincial risk. 56% of the reduction in the rst regime change can be attributed
to systematic risk. For the second regime change, systematic risk accounts for 67% of the
reduction.
[Insert Table 6 here]
5.4 Mean sector share changes
The changes of the variance of the residual innovation qj, V ar (qj) and the changes of
the three major risk factors, SY S;PROV;COV , can be further decomposed into two
components. The rst is the changes in the mean sector shares aj; the second is the changes






. Let us consider the changes from regime 1 to
regime 2 as an example; the calculation for changes from regime 2 to regime 3 is identical.
One possible concern is that the reduction of the variance may come from the changes in the




j be the average sector share in regime 2 and regime 1. Changes
of the variance of the residual innovation qj, V ar (qj) between regime 1 and regime 2 can be








total changes are decomposed into two parts: the rst two terms in Equation (6) gives the
contribution from the changes of the mean sector shares aj; the second two terms in Equation























































Table (6) reports the results from this decomposition. For example, SysShare gives the
changes in SYS due to the changes in the mean sector share; and SysCov gives the changes
in SYS due to the changes in the variance-covariance matrix. The contributions of the mean
sector share changes are negligible. Because the variance-covariance matrix for PROV is
but a scalar, the mean share change does not a¤ect the PROV at all. The results here
conrm our previous discussion in Section 5 that the changes of the composition of di¤erent
industries will not explain the reduction in volatility.
[Insert Table 6 here]
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we document the dramatic two-phase moderation in output volatility in China
from 1949-2008. We show that Chinas output volatility measured by the standard deviation
of real gross domestic product (GDP) growth over the specied rolling windows exhibit an
unambiguous declining trend. The magnitude of the reduction in China is comparable with
the Great Moderation in most industrialized economies. We nd that the output volatility
experiences the sharpest decline when transforming from a central planning economy to a
transitional market economy. We explain why this sharpest decline in output volatility
occurred in 1978. The strong central government control imposes systematic risk on the
economy. Policy errors transformed into large drops in the output of all provinces. When
the government nally realized their errors, the correction of these errors will create, on the
opposite, a signicant rebound in output of all provinces. This process, therefore, resulted in
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the high output volatility at the national level during the central planning era. By deviating
away from central planning, the decrease in provincial co-movement, thus, reduced the output
volatility.
In the end, although evidences of the striking moderation in output uctuation in China
during the past half century and the past twenty to thirty years are clear, the explanations
for this moderation are still not complete. We provide one possible explanation for the
sudden drop in the 1970s, which we think play a critical role. But there might be other
explanations. Our research, therefore, should be considered as a rst step. More researches
employing better and more rigorous econometric models or using new available dataset that
go beyond what we have addressed above are, needless to say, in high demand in order to
better understand the moderation in China. At the same time, researches about Chinas
moderation can also be helpful in the understanding of Chinas great economic success in
general.
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7 Appendix
We extend Koren and Tenreyro (2007)s [16] estimation strategy from a cross-country de-
composition to a within country cross-province decomposition. In terms of the econometric
specication, our method is more similar to Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) [13]. Let inno-
vations in province j be denoted qj. By a rst-order approximation, it can be expressed as




ajstyjst; qjt = a
0
jtyjt (7)
yjst is innovation in province j and sector s at time t after controlling for other factors.
To separate the common national risk from that of the geographic and sectoral composition,
we can further break down yjst into four components:
yjst = Ct + st + jt + "jst
where Ct is the national shock common to all provinces; jt is specic to a province but
common to all sectors; st is specic to a sector but common to all provinces; "jst captures
the unexplained residual. Note that this decomposition is cross-sectional and time t is xed.
7.1 Statistical specication
In the statistical specication, we measure national shocks as the cross-province and cross-
sector average of yjst. Province-specic shocks are then identied as the within province
average of yjst using only the portion not explained by national shocks. Sector-specic shocks
as the cross-province average of yjst using only the portion not explained by nation-specic














































where the second equality holds because we will prove that
P
j=1
bjt = 0 later.
b"jst = yjst   bCt   bjt   bst
To decompose the overall volatility, rewrite the innovations in matrix notation. Denote
yj the vector of sectoral innovations in province j; aj the vector of sectoral shares in province
j. Write the decomposition in matrix form:
yj = C1+ + j1+ "j (8)
Therefore, using equation (7) the variance of the total innovations is given by:
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"j + Covj + Covs +  j
where 
N = E (C
2110) collects variance of the national shocks; 
 = E (
0) is the sector-
specic variance covariance matrix; 
"j collects the variances of the sector- and province-










collects the covariances of national shocks with the province-specic shocks, Covs = E (C1
0 + C10)
















] collects the remaining
terms.
Therefore, the total variance thus can be decomposed into the following parts:
V ar (qj) = SY S + PROV + COV +RES
where SY S = a0j (
N + 





aj; COV = a
0







The variance covariance matrices are estimated by the corresponding sample variance








































and the elements in b
"j is estimated by b2js = 1T
TP
t=1
b"2jst:Given the estimates of all the vari-
























The above statistical specication can also be expressed equivalently in an econometric
specication as following:








where di are dummies for each sector, hj are dummies for each province, and "jst is the
regression residual.
This constrained OLS is then carried out for every year to generate the respective bCt, bjt
and bst. The results are identical to the statistical specication. The proof is as follows.













s:t: 10 = 0; 10 = 0
where Y is the JS  1 vector of shocks (stacking the S sector of province 1 on S sectors of
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yj denote the S  1 vector of the sum of shocks across provinces, m denote
the J  1 vector of the sum of shocks across sectors within a province; and g = 10l denote
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yjst   bCt   bjt
#
= S bCt   S bCt
= 0
Therefore, bCt, bt, bt does solve the rst order condition. We have by far proved that
the statistical specication is identical to the econometric specication. We also show this
equivalence in our programs quantitatively.
7.3 Regime Change
The most important feature of Chinese economy over the past fty year is regime changes.
Shortly after the establishment of the new Chinese government, it adopted a Soviet style of
central planning. In 1978, China started its decades long transition into a market economy.
In 1992, after the famous southern tour of Deng Xiaoping and the third plenary session
of the fourteenth central committee, the pace of Chinese economic reform accelerated. We
want to capture those dramatic changes. So in our estimation, Yjst is calculated using three
separate regime periods i.e. 1953-1977 & 1978-1994 & 1995-2008.
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Chow Breakpoint Test: 1980 1994
Null Hypothesis: No breaks at specied breakpoints
Equation Sample: 1953 2008
F-statistic 2.629912 Prob. F(4,50) 0.0452
Log likelihood ratio 10.69293 Prob. Chi-Square(4) 0.0302
Wald Statistic 10.57919 Prob. Chi-Square(4) 0.0317
Table 1: Chow Test
Changes in Output Volatility: Di¤erent Detrending Methods
Standard Deviation
1955-1977 1978-1994 1995-2006 1978-2006 C12 Change C23 Change C14 Change
HP 100 0.119 0.038 0.025 0.033 -0.684 -0.348 -0.723
HP 6.25 0.085 0.024 0.009 0.019 -0.718 -0.622 -0.775
BP 0.081 0.022 0.009 0.018 -0.722 -0.603 -0.777
Log D 0.112 0.032 0.014 0.026 -0.717 -0.565 -0.773
Note: each row uses di¤erent detrending methods. HP100: HP-lter with parameter 100 for annual series;
HP6.25: HP-lter with parameter 6.25 for annual series; BP: Baxter-King lter with 2-8 years cycle
periods; Log D: log di¤erence.
Table 2: Di¤erent Detrending Methods
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Summary stats: controls
Variable Mean Std N
Regime 1
CPI ination 0.012 0.056 432
(Deposit+Loan)/NGDP 0.786 0.441 706
(Export+Import)/NGDP 0.040 0.056 428
Inventory change/NGDP 0.077 0.065 661
Regime 2
CPI ination 0.086 0.075 409
(Deposit+Loan)/NGDP 1.350 0.450 476
(Export+Import)/NGDP 0.163 0.448 463
Inventory change/NGDP 0.097 0.063 476
Regime 3
CPI ination 0.034 0.049 378
(Deposit+Loan)/NGDP 2.246 0.751 392
(Export+Import)/NGDP 0.273 0.368 392
Inventory change/NGDP 0.067 0.076 385




VARIABLES Y1 Y2 Y3
Lag1 Ination -0.114* -0.521*** -1.021***
(0.0646) (0.108) (0.175)
Regime1 Lag1 Ination interaction 0.0865 0.555*** 0.891***
(0.0697) (0.117) (0.189)
Regime2 Lag1 Ination interaction 0.102 0.514*** 0.959***
(0.0710) (0.119) (0.192)
Lag1 CreditRation 0.287*** 0.325*** 0.983***
(0.0532) (0.0890) (0.144)
Regime1 Lag1 CreditRation interaction -0.213** -0.231* -1.125***
(0.0835) (0.140) (0.226)
Regime2 Lag1 CreditRation interaction -0.331*** -0.298** -0.956***
(0.0827) (0.138) (0.224)
Lag1 Openness 0.514 0.391 1.632*
(0.365) (0.612) (0.991)
Regime1 Lag1 Openness interaction -0.600 -0.395 -1.517
(0.373) (0.624) (1.010)
Regime2 Lag1 Openness interaction -0.532 -0.353 -1.627
(0.373) (0.624) (1.010)
Lag1 Inventory 0.326*** 1.669*** 1.642***
(0.0881) (0.148) (0.239)
Regime1 Lag1 Inventory interaction -0.442*** -1.795*** -1.899***
(0.152) (0.254) (0.411)
Regime2 Lag1 Inventory interaction -0.401*** -1.660*** -1.619***
(0.153) (0.255) (0.414)
Constant 0.00112 0.00101 0.00719
(0.00189) (0.00317) (0.00513)
Observations 935 935 935
R-squared 0.073 0.195 0.182
Note: Lags of independent variables and interactions with regime dummies are included. Ination is
calculated using CPI; CreditRation is measured as (Deposit+Loan)/NGDP; openness is measured as
(Export+Import)/NGDP; inventory variable is measured as Inventory change/NGDP. Detrend method for
others: hp lter. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4: Control Regressions
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CTR SYS PROV COV RES EXP
R1 1.000 0.561 0.492 -0.080 0.007 0.980
R2 1.000 0.672 0.486 -0.099 -0.140 0.919
Table 5: Volatility Reduction Accounting
SysCov SysShare ProvCov ProvShare CovCov CovShare
R1 0.564 0.005 0.513 0.000 -0.212 -0.033
R2 0.652 -0.006 0.499 0.000 -0.101 0.010












Source: PWT 8.0 not PPP adjusted
Output Volatility Before and After Reforms: Asia
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Figure 5: Output Volatility: All Provinces
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Figure 6: National Volatility
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Figure 7: Local competition: better governor
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Figure 15: Covariance Risk
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